Fuzzy extractors derive strong keys from noisy sources. Their security is defined informationtheoretically, which limits the length of the derived key, sometimes making it too short to be useful. We ask whether it is possible to obtain longer keys by considering computational security, and show the following.
Introduction
Authentication generally requires a secret drawn from some high-entropy source. One of the primary building blocks for authentication is reliable key derivation. Unfortunately, many sources that contain sufficient entropy to derive a key are noisy, and provide similar, but not identical secret values at each reading (examples of such sources include biometrics [Dau04] , human memory [ZH93], pictorial passwords [BS00] , measurements of capacitance [TSv + 06], timing [SD07], motion [CM05] , quantum information [BBR88] etc.).
Fuzzy extractors [DORS08] achieve reliable key derivation from noisy sources (see [BDK + 05, DW09, CKOR10] for applications of fuzzy extractors). The setting consists of two algorithms: Generate (used once) and Reproduce (used subsequently). The Generate (Gen) algorithm takes an input w and produces a key r and a public value p. This information allows the Reproduce (Rep) algorithm to reproduce r given p and some value w that is close to w (according to some predefined metric, such as Hamming distance). Crucially for security, knowledge of p should not reveal r; that is, r should be uniformly distributed conditioned on p. This feature is needed because p is not secret: for example, in a single-user setting (where the user wants to reproduce the key r from a subsequent reading w ), it would be stored in the clear; and in a key agreement application [BDK + 05] (where two parties have w and w , respectively), it would be transmitted between the parties.
Fuzzy extractors use ideas from information-reconciliation [BBR88] and are defined (traditionally) as information-theoretic objects. The entropy loss of a fuzzy extractor is the difference between the entropy of w and the length of the derived key r. In the information-theoretic setting, some entropy loss is necessary as the value p contains enough information to reproduce r from any close value w . A goal of fuzzy extractor constructions is to minimize the entropy loss, increasing the security of the resulting application. Indeed, if the entropy loss is too high, the resulting secret key may be too short to be useful.
We ask whether it is possible to obtain longer keys by considering computational, rather than information theoretic, security.
Our Negative Results
We first study (in Section 3) whether it could be fruitful to relax the definition of the main building block of a fuzzy extractor, called a secure sketch. A secure sketch is a one-round information reconciliation protocol: it produces a public value s that allows recovery of w from any close value w . The traditional secrecy requirement of a secure sketch is that w has high min-entropy conditioned on s. This allows the fuzzy extractor of [DORS08] to form the key r by applying a randomness extractor [NZ93] to w, because randomness extractors produce random strings from strings with conditional min-entropy. We call this the sketch-and-extract construction.
The most natural relaxation of the min-entropy requirement of the secure sketch is to require HILL entropy [HILL99] (namely, that the distribution of w conditioned on s be indistinguishable from a highmin-entropy distribution). Under this definition, we could still use a randomness extractor to obtain r from w, because it would yield a pseudorandom key. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that such a relaxation will yield fruitful results: we prove in Theorem 3.6 that the entropy loss of such secure sketches is subject to the same coding bounds as the ones that constrain information-theoretic secure sketches.
Another possible relaxation is to require that the value w is unpredictable conditioned on s. This definition would also allow the use of a randomness extractor to get a pseudorandom key, although it would have to be a special extractor-one that has a reconstruction procedure (see [HLR07, Lemma 6] ). Unfortunately, this relaxation is also unlikely to be fruitful: we prove in Theorem 3.10 that the unpredictability is at most log the size of the metric space minus log the volume of the ball of radius t. For high-entropy sources of w over the Hamming metric, this bound matches the best informationtheoretic security sketches.
Our Positive Results Both of the above negative results arise because a secure sketch functions like a decoder of an error-correcting code. To avoid them, we give up on building computational secure sketches and focus directly on the entropy loss in fuzzy extractors. Our goal is to decrease the entropy loss in a fuzzy extractor by allowing the key r to be pseudorandom conditioned on p.
By considering this computational secrecy requirement, we construct the first lossless computational fuzzy extractors (Construction 4.1), where the derived key r is as long as the entropy of the source w. Our construction is for the Hamming metric and uses the code-offset construction [JW99] ,[DORS08, Section 5] used in prior work, but with two crucial differences. First, the key r is not extracted from w like in the sketch-and-extract approach; rather w "encrypts" r in a way that is decryptable with the knowledge of some close w (this idea is similar to the way the code-offset construction is presented in [JW99] as a "fuzzy commitment") . Second, the code used is a random linear code, which allows us to use the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption due to Regev [Reg05, Reg10] and derive a longer key r. Specifically, we use the recent result of Döttling and Müller-Quade [DMQ13] , which shows the hardness of decoding random linear codes when the error vector comes from the uniform distribution, with each coordinate ranging over a small interval. This allows us to use w as the error vector, assuming it is uniform. We also use a result of Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan [AGV09] , which says that LWE has many hardcore bits, to hide r.
Because we use a random linear code, our decoding is limited to reconciling a logarithmic number of differences. Unfortunately, we cannot utilize the results that improve the decoding radius through the use of trapdoors (such as [Reg05]), because in a fuzzy extractor, there is no secret storage place for the trapdoor. If improved decoding algorithms are obtained for random linear codes, they will improve error-tolerance of our construction. Given the hardness of decoding random linear codes [BMvT78], we do not expect significant improvement in error-tolerance of our construction.
In Section 5, we are able to relax the assumption that w comes from the uniform distribution, and instead allow w to come from a symbol-fixing source [KZ07] (each dimension is either uniform or fixed). This relaxation follows from our results about the hardness of LWE when samples have a fixed (and adversarially known) error vector, which may be of independent interest (Theorem 5.2).
An Alternative Approach Computational extractors [Kra10, BDK + 11, DSGKM12] have the same goal of obtaining a pseudorandom key r from a source w in the setting without errors. They can be constructed, for example, by applying to pseudorandom generator to the output of an information-theoretic extractor. One way to build a computational fuzzy extractor is by using a computational extractor instead of the information-theoretic extractor in the sketch-and-extract construction of [DORS08] . However, this approach is possible only if conditional min-entropy of w conditioned on the sketch s is high enough. We compare the two approaches in Section 4.4.
Preliminaries
For a random variable X = X 1 ||...||X n where each X i is over some alphabet Z, we denote by 
We denote by D ssec the class of randomized circuits which output a single bit and have size at most s sec . For a metric space (M, dis), the (closed) ball of radius t around x is the set of all points within radius t, that is, B t (x) = {y|dis(x, y) ≤ t}. If the size of a ball in a metric space does not depend on x, we denote by |B t (·)| the size of a ball of radius t. For the Hamming metric over Z n , |B t (·)| = t i=0 n t (|Z| − 1) i . U n denotes the uniformly distributed random variable on {0, 1} n . Usually, we use bold letters for vectors or matrices, capitalized letters for random variables, and lowercase letters for elements in a vector or samples from a random variable.
Fuzzy Extractors and Secure Sketches
We now recall definitions and lemmas from the work of Dodis et. al. [DORS08, Sections 2.5-4.1], adapted to allow for a small probability of error, as discussed in [DORS08, Sections 8] . Let M be a metric space with distance function dis.
Definition 2.1. An (M, m, , t, )-fuzzy extractor with error δ is a pair of randomized procedures, "generate" (Gen) and "reproduce" (Rep), with the following properties:
1. The generate procedure Gen on input w ∈ M outputs an extracted string r ∈ {0, 1} and a helper string p ∈ {0, 1} * .
2. The reproduction procedure Rep takes an element w ∈ M and a bit string p ∈ {0, 1} * as inputs.
The correctness property of fuzzy extractors guarantees that for w and w such that dis(w, w ) ≤ t, if R, P were generated by (R, P ) ← Gen(w), then Rep(w , P ) = R with probability (over the coins of Gen, Rep) at least 1 − δ. If dis(w, w ) > t, then no guarantee is provided about the output of Rep.
3. The security property guarantees that for any distribution W on M of min-entropy m, the string R is nearly uniform even for those who observe P :
A fuzzy extractor is efficient if Gen and Rep run in expected polynomial time.
Secure sketches are the main technical tool in the construction of fuzzy extractors. Secure sketches produce a string s that does not decrease the entropy of w too much, while allowing recovery of w from a close w : Definition 2.2. An (M, m,m, t)-secure sketch with error δ is a pair of randomized procedures, "sketch" (SS) and "recover" (Rec), with the following properties:
1. The sketching procedure SS on input w ∈ M returns a bit string s ∈ {0, 1} * .
2. The recovery procedure Rec takes an element w ∈ M and a bit string s ∈ {0, 1} * . The correctness property of secure sketches guarantees that if dis(w, w ) ≤ t, then Pr[Rec(w , SS(w)) = w] ≥ 1 − δ where the probability is taken over the coins of SS and Rec. If dis(w, w ) > t, then no guarantee is provided about the output of Rec.
3. The security property guarantees that for any distribution W over M with min-entropy m, the value of W can be recovered by the adversary who observes w with probability no greater than 2 −m . That is,H ∞ (W |SS(W )) ≥m.
A secure sketch is efficient if SS and Rec run in expected polynomial time.
Note that in the above definition of secure sketches (resp., fuzzy extractors), the errors are chosen before s (resp., P ) is known: if the error pattern between w and w depends the output of SS (resp., Gen), then there is no guarantee about the probability of correctness.
A fuzzy extractor can be produced from a secure sketch and an average-case randomness extractor. An average-case extractor is a generalization of a strong randomness extractor [NZ93, Definition 2]) (in particular, Vadhan [Vad12, Problem 6.8] showed that all strong extractors are average-case extractors with a slight loss of parameters): • Gen(w) : generate x ← {0, 1} d , set p = (SS(w), x), r = ext(w; x), and output (r, p).
• Rep(w , (s, x)) : recover w = Rec(w , s) and output r = ext(w; x).
The main parameter we will be concerned with is the entropy loss of the construction. In this paper, we ask whether a smaller entropy loss can be achieved by considering a fuzzy extractor with a computational security requirement. We therefore relax the security requirement of Definition 2.1 to require a pseudorandom output instead of a truly random output. Also, for notational convenience, we modify the definition so that we can specify a general class of sources for which the fuzzy extractor is designed to work, rather than limiting ourselves to the class of sources that consists of all sources of a given minentropy m, as in definitions above (of course, this modification can also be applied to prior definitions of information-theoretic secure sketches and fuzzy extractors).
Definition 2.5 (Computational Fuzzy Extractor). Let W be a family of probability distributions over M. A pair of randomized procedures "generate" (Gen) and "reproduce" (Rep) is a (M, W, , t)-computational fuzzy extractor that is ( , s sec )-hard with error δ if Gen and Rep satisfy the following properties:
• The generate procedure Gen on input w ∈ M outputs an extracted string R ∈ {0, 1} and a helper string P ∈ {0, 1} * .
• The reproduction procedure Rep takes an element w ∈ M and a bit string P ∈ {0, 1} * as inputs. The correctness property guarantees that if dis(w, w ) ≤ t and (R, P ) ← Gen(w), then Pr[Rep(w , P ) = R] ≥ 1 − δ where the probability is over the randomness of (Gen, Rep). If d(w, w ) > t, then no guarantee is provided about the output of Rep.
• The security property guarantees that for any distribution W ∈ W, the string R is pseudorandom conditioned on P , that is δ Ds sec ((R, P ), (U , P )) ≤ .
Any efficient fuzzy extractor is also a computational fuzzy extractor with the same parameters.
Impossibility of Computational Secure Sketches
In this section, we consider whether it is possible in build a secure sketch that retains significantly more computational than information-theoretic entropy. We consider two different notions for computational entropy, and for both of them show that corresponding secure sketches are subject to the same upper bounds as those for information-theoretic secure sketches. Thus, it seems that relaxing security of sketches from information-theoretic to computational does not help.
In particular, for the case of the Hamming metric and inputs that have full entropy, our results are as follows. In Section 3.1 we show that a sketch that retains HILL entropy implies a sketch that retains nearly the same amount of min-entropy. In Section 3.2, we show that the computational unpredictability of a sketch is at most log |M| − log |B t (·)|. Dodis 
Intuitively, HILL entropy is as good as average min-entropy for all computationally-bounded observers. Thus, redefining secure sketches using HILL entropy is a natural relaxation of the original information-theoretic definition; in particular, the sketch-and-extract construction in Lemma 2.4 would yield pseudorandom outputs if the secure sketch ensured high HILL entropy. We will consider secure sketches that retain relaxed HILL entropy: that is, we say that (SS, Rec) is a HILL-entropy (M, m,m, t) secure sketch that is ( , s sec )-hard with error δ if it satisfies Definition 2.2, with the security requirement replaced by H HILL-rlx ,ssec
Unfortunately, we will show below that such a secure sketch implies an error correcting code with approximately 2m points that can correct t random errors (see [DORS08, Lemma C.1] for a similar bound on information-theoretic secure sketches). For the Hamming metric, our result essentially matches the bound on information-theoretic secure sketches of [DORS08, Proposition 8.2]. In fact, we show that, for the Hamming metric, HILL-entropy secure sketches imply information-theoretic ones with similar parameters, and, therefore, the HILL relaxation gives no advantage.
The intuition for building error-correcting codes from HILL-entropy secure sketches is as follows. In order to have H HILL-rlx ,ssec (W |SS(W )) ≥m, there must be a distribution X, Y such thatH ∞ (X|Y ) ≥m and (X, Y ) is computationally indistinguishable from (W, SS(W )). Sample a sketch s ← SS(W ). We know that SS followed by Rec likely succeeds on W |s (i.e., Rec(w , s) = w with high probability for w ← W |s and w ← B t (w)). Consider the following experiment: 1) sample y ← Y , 2) draw x ← X|y and 3) x ← B t (x). By indistinguishability, Rec(x , y) = x with high probability. This means we can construct a large set C from the support of X|y. C will be an error correcting code and Rec an efficient decoder. We can then use standard arguments to turn this code into an information theoretic sketch.
To make this intuition precise, we need an additional technical condition: sampling a random neighbor of a point is efficient. Definition 3.2. We say a metric space (M, dis) is (s neigh , t)-neighborhood samplable if there exists a randomized circuit Neigh of size s neigh that for all t ≤ t, Neigh(w, t ) outputs a random point at distance t of w.
We review definitions of Shannon codes [SWBH49]:
Definition 3.3. Let C be a set over space M. We say that C is an (t, )-Shannon code if there exists an efficient procedure Rec such that for all t ≤ t and for all c ∈ C, Pr[Rec(Neigh(c, t )) = c] ≤ . To distinguish it from the average-error Shannon code defined below, we will sometimes call it maximal-error Shannon code. This is a slightly stronger formulation than usual, in that for every size t < t we require the code to correct t random errors 2 .
Shannon codes work for all codewords. We can also consider a formulation that works for an "average" codeword.
Definition 3.4. Let C be a distribution over space M. We say that C is an (t, )-average error Shannon code if there exists an efficient procedure Rec such that for all
An average error Shannon code is one whose average probability of error is bounded by . See [CT06, for definitions of average and maximal error probability. An average-error Shannon code is convertible to a maximal-error Shannon code with a small loss. We use the following pruning argument from [CT06, Pages 202-204] (we provide a proof in Section C.1):
Lemma 3.5. Let C be a (t, )-average error Shannon code with recovery procedure Rec such that H ∞ (C) ≥ k. There is a set C with |C | ≥ 2 k−1 that is a (t, 2 )-(maximal error) Shannon code with recovery procedure Rec.
We can now formalize the intuition above and show that a sketch that retainsm-bits of relaxed HILL entropy implies a good error correcting code with nearly 2m points (proof in Section C.2).
Theorem 3.6. Let (M, dis) be a metric space that is (s neigh , t)-neighborhood samplable. Let (SS, Rec) be an HILL-entropy (M, m,m, t)-secure sketch that is ( , s sec )-secure with error δ. Let s rec denote the size of the circuit that computes Rec. If s sec ≥ (t(s neigh + s rec )), then there exists a value s and a set C with |C| ≥ 2m −2 that is a (t, 4( + tδ))-Shannon code with recovery procedure Rec(·, s).
For the Hamming metric, any Shannon code (as defined in Definition 3.3) can be converted into an information-theoretic secure sketch (as described in [DORS08, Section 8.2] and references therein). The idea is to use the code offset construction, and convert worst-case errors to random errors by randomizing the order of the bits of w first, via a randomly chosen permutation π (which becomes part of the sketch and is applied to w during Rec). The formal statement of this result can be expressed in the following Lemma (which is implicit in [DORS08, Section 8.2]).
Lemma 3.7. For an alphabet Z, let C over Z n be a (t, δ) Shannon code. Then there exists a (Z n , m, m − (n log |Z| − log |C|), t) secure sketch with error δ for the Hamming metric over Z n .
Putting together Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 gives us the negative result for the Hamming metric: a HILL-entropy secure sketch (for the uniform distribution) implies an information-theoretic one with similar parameters:
Corollary 3.8. Let Z be an alphabet. Let (SS , Rec ) be an ( , s sec )-HILL-entropy (Z n , n log |Z|,m, t)-secure sketch with error δ for the Hamming metric over Z n , with Rec of circuit size s rec . If s sec ≥ t(s rec + n log |Z|), then there exists a (Z n , n log |Z|,m − 2, t) (information-theoretic) secure sketch with error 4( + tδ).
Notes: In Corollary 3.8 we make no claim about the efficiency of the resulting (SS, Rec), because the proof of Theorem 3.6 is not constructive.
Corollary 3.8 extends to non-uniform distributions: if there exists a distribution whose HILL sketch retainsm bits of entropy, then for all distributions W , there is an information theoretic sketch that retains H ∞ (W ) − (n log |Z| −m) − 2 bits of entropy.
Bounds on Secure Sketches using Unpredictability Entropy
In the previous section, we showed that any sketch that retained HILL entropy could be transformed into an information theoretic sketch. However, HILL entropy is a strong notion. In this section, we therefore ask whether it is useful to consider a sketch that satisfies a minimal requirement: the value of the input is computationally hard to guess given the sketch. We begin by recalling the definition of conditional unpredictability entropy, which captures the notion of "hard to guess" (we relax the definition slightly, similarly to the relaxation of HILL entropy described in the previous section).
Definition 3.9. [HLR07, Definition 7] Let (W, S) be a pair of random variables. We say that W has relaxed unpredictability entropy at least k conditioned on S, denoted by H unp-rlx ,ssec (W |S) ≥ k, if there exists a pair of distributions (X, Y ) such that δ Ds sec ((W, S), (X, Y )) ≤ , and for all circuits I of size s sec ,
We will say that a pair of procedures (SS, Rec) is a unpredictability-entropy (M, m,m, t) secure sketch that is ( , s sec )-hard with error δ if it satisfies Definition 2.2, with the security requirement replaced by H unp-rlx ,ssec (W |SS(W )) ≥m. Note this notion is quite natural: combining such a secure sketch in a sketch-and-extract construction of Lemma 2.4 with a particular type of extractor (called a extractor reconstructive [BSW03] ), would yield a computational fuzzy extractor (per [HLR07, Lemma 6]).
Unfortunately, the conditional unpredictability entropym must decrease as t increases, as the following theorem states. (The proof of the theorem, generalized to more metric spaces, is in Section C.3.) Theorem 3.10. Let Z be an alphabet (SS, Rec) be an unpredictability-entropy (Z n , m,m, t)-secure sketch that is ( , s sec )-secure with error δ. If s sec ≥ t(|Rec| + n log |Z|), thenm ≤ n log |Z| − log |B t (·)| + log(1 − − tδ).
In particular, if the input is uniform, the entropy loss is about log |B t (·)|. As mentioned at the beginning of Section 3, essentially the same entropy loss can be achieved with information-theoretic secure sketches, by using the randomized code-offset construction. However, it is conceivable that unpredictability entropy secure sketches could achieve lower entropy loss with greater efficiency for some parameter settings.
Avoiding sketch entropy upper bounds
The lower bounds of Corollary 3.8 and Theorem 3.10 are strongest for high entropy sources. This is necessary, if a source contains only codewords (of an error correcting code), no sketch is needed, and thus there is no (computational) entropy loss. This same situation occurs when considering lower bounds for information-theoretic sketches [DORS08, Appendix C] .
Both of lower bounds arise because Rec must function as an error-correcting code for many points of any indistinguishable distribution. It may be possible to avoid these bounds if Rec outputs a fresh random variable 3 . Such an algorithm is called a computational fuzzy conductor. See [KR09] for the definition of a fuzzy conductor. To the best of our knowledge, a computational fuzzy conductor has not been defined in the literature, the natural definition is to replace the pseudorandomness condition in Definition 2.5 with a HILL entropy requirement.
Our construction (in Section 4) has pseudorandom output and immediately satisfies definition of a computational fuzzy extractor (Definition 2.5). It may be possible to achieve significantly better parameters with a construction that is a computational fuzzy conductor (but not a computational fuzzy extractor) and then applying an extractor. We leave this as an open problem.
Computational Fuzzy Extractor based on LWE
In this section we describe our main construction. Security of our construction depends on the source W . We first consider a uniform source W ; we consider other distributions in Section 5. Our construction uses the code-offset construction [JW99] , [DORS08, Section 5] instantiated with a random linear code over a finite field F q . Let Decode t be an algorithm that decodes a random linear code with at most t errors (we will present such an algorithm later, in Section 4.2).
Construction 4.1. Let n be a security parameter and let m ≥ n. Let q be a prime. Define Gen, Rep as follows:
4. Output (r, p).
Rep
1. Input: (w , p) (where the Hamming distance between w and w is at most t).
Parse p as
Intuitively, security comes from the computational hardness of decoding random linear codes with a high number of errors (introduced by w). In fact, we know that decoding a random linear code is NP-hard [BMvT78] ; however, this statement is not sufficient for our security goal, which is to show δ Ds sec ((X 1,...,n/2 , P ), (U n/2 log q , P )) ≤ . Furthermore, this construction is only useful if Decode t can be efficiently implemented.
The rest of this section is devoted to making these intuitive statements precise. We describe the LWE problem and the security of our construction in Section 4.1. We describe one possible polynomial-time Decode t (which corrects more errors than is possible by exhaustive search) in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we describe parameter settings that allow us to extract as many bits as the input entropy, resulting in a lossless construction. In Section 4.4, we compare Construction 4.1 to using a sketch-and-extract approach (Lemma 2.4) instantiated with a computational extractor.
Security of Construction 4.1
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [Reg05, Reg10] as a generalization of "learning parity with noise." We now recall the definition of the decisional version of the problem. Pei09] show that dist-LWE n,m,q,χ is secure when the distribution χ of errors is Gaussian, as follows. LetΨ ρ be the discretized Gaussian distribution with variance (ρq) 2 /2π, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) with ρq > 2 √ n. If GAPSVP and SIVP are hard to approximate (on lattices of dimension n) within polynomial factors for quantum algorithms, then dist-LWE n,m,q,Ψ m ρ is secure. The above formulation of LWE requires the error term to come from the discretized Gaussian distribution, which makes it difficult to use it for constructing fuzzy extractors (because using w and w to sample Gaussian distributions will increase the distance between the error terms and/or reduce their entropy). Fortunately, recent work Döttling and Müller-Quade [DMQ13] shows the security of LWE, under the same assumptions, when errors come from the uniform distribution over a small interval 5 . This allows us to directly encode w as the error term in an LWE problem by splitting it into m blocks. The size of these blocks is dictated by the following result of Döttling and Müller-Quade:
Definition 4.2 (Decisional LWE
Lemma 4.3. [DMQ13, Corollary 1] Let n be a security parameter. Let q = q(n) = poly(n) be a prime and m = m(n) = poly(n) be an integer with m ≥ 3n. Let σ ∈ (0, 1) be an arbitrarily small constant and let ρ = ρ(n) ∈ (0, 1/10) be such that ρq ≥ 2n 1/2+σ m. If the approximate decision-version of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) are hard within a factor ofÕ(n 1+σ m/ρ) for quantum algorithms in the worst case, then, for χ the uniform distribution over [−ρq, ρq] m , dist-LWE n,m,q,χ is secure.
To extract pseudorandom bits, we use a result of Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan [AGV09] to show that X has simultaneously many hardcore bits. The result says that if dist-LWE (n−k,m,q,χ) is secure then any k variables of X in a dist-LWE (n,m,q,χ) instance are hardcore. We state their result for a general error distribution (noting that their proof does not depend on the error distribution):
where U denotes the uniform distribution over F k q , A denotes the uniform distribution over F m×n q , X denotes the uniform distribution over F n q , X 1,...,k denote the first k coordinates of x, and s sec ≈ s sec − n 3 .
The security of Construction 4.1 follows from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 as long as all the parameters are set appropriately (see Theorem 4.7), because we use the hardcore bits of X as our key. 6. If b − Ax has more than t nonzero coordinates, go to step (2).
Efficiency of Construction
4.1 Construction 4.1 is useful only if Decode t can be efficiently implemented. We need a decoding algorithm for a random linear code with t errors that runs in polynomial time. We present a simple Decode t that runs in polynomial time and can correct correcting O(log n) errors (note that this corresponds to a superpolynomial number of possible error patterns). This algorithm is only a proof of concept, and neither the algorithm nor its analysis have been optimized for constants. An improved decoding algorithm can replace our algorithm, which will increase our correcting capability and improve Construction 4.1. Construction 4.5. We consider a setting of (n, m, q, χ) where m ≥ 3n. We describe Decode t : 1. Input A, b = Ax + w − w 2. Randomly select rows without replacement i 1 , ..., i 2n ← [1, m].
Output x .
Each step is computable in time O(n 3 ). For Decode t to be efficient, we need t to be small enough so that with probability at least 1 poly(n) , none of the 2n rows selected in step 2 have errors (i.e., so that w and w agree on those rows). If this happens, and A i 1 ,...,i 2n has rank n (which is highly likely), then x = x, and the algorithm terminates. However, we also need to ensure correctness: we need to make sure that if x = x, we detect it in step 6. This detection will happen if b − Ax = A(x − x ) + (w − w ) has more than t nonzero coordinates. It suffices to ensure that A(x − x ) has at least 2t + 1 nonzero coordinates (because at most t of those can be zeroed out by w − w ), which happens whenever the code generated by A has distance 2t + 1.
Setting t = O( m n log n) is sufficient to ensure efficiency. Random linear codes have distance at least O( m n log n) with probability 1 − e −Ω(n) (the exact statement is in Corollary A.2), so this also ensures correctness. The formal statement is below (proof in Section C.4): Lemma 4.6 (Efficiency of Decode t when t ≤ d(m/n − 2) log n). Let d be a positive constant and assume that dis(W, W ) ≤ t where t ≤ d( m n − 2) log n. Then Decode t runs in expected time O(n 4d+3 ) operations in F q (this expectation is over the choice of random coins of Decode t , regardless of the input, as long as dis(w, w ) ≤ t). It outputs X with probability 1 − e −Ω(n) (this probability is over the choice of the random matrix A and random choices made by Decode t ).
Lossless Computational Fuzzy Extractor
We now state a setting of parameters that yields a lossless construction.
Theorem 4.7. Let n be a security parameter and let the number of errors t = c log n for some positive constant c. Let d be a positive constant (giving us a tradeoff between running time of Rep and |w|). Consider the Hamming metric over the alphabet Z = [−2 b−1 , 2 b−1 ], where b = log 2(c/d+ 2)n 2 = O(log n). Let W be uniform over M = Z m , where m = (c/d + 2)n = O(n). If GAPSVP and SIVP are hard to approximate within polynomial factors using quantum algorithms, then there is a setting of q = poly(n) such that for any polynomial s sec = poly(n) there exists = ngl(n) such that the following holds: Construction 4.1 is a (M, W, m log |Z|, t)-computational fuzzy extractor that is ( , s sec )-hard with error δ = e −Ω(n) . The generate procedure Gen takes O(n 2 ) operations over F q , and the reproduce procedure Rep takes expected time O(n 4d+3 ) operations over F q . Theorem 4.7 shows that a computational fuzzy extractor can be built without incurring any entropy loss. We can essentially think of AX + W as an encryption of X that where decryption works from any close W .
Comparison with computational-extractor-based constructions
As we already mentioned in the introduction, an alternative approach to building a computational fuzzy extractor is to use a computational extractor (e.g., [Kra10, BDK + 11, DSGKM12]) in place of the information-theoretic extractor in the sketch-and-extract construction. We will call this approach sketch-and-comp-extract. (A simple example of a computational extractor is a pseudorandom generator applied to the output of an information-theoretic extractor; note that LWE-based pseudorandom generators exist [AIK06] .)
This approach (specifically, its analysis via Lemma 2.4) works as long as the amount of entropym of w conditioned on the sketch s remains high enough to run a computational extractor. However, as discussed in Section 3,m decreases with the error parameter t due to coding bounds, and it is conceivable that, if W has barely enough entropy to begin with, it will have too little entropy left to run a computational extractor once s is known.
In contrast, our approach does not require the entropy of w conditioned on p = (A, AX +w) to be high enough for a computational extractor. Instead, we require that w is not computationally recoverable given p. This requirement is weaker-in particular, in our construction, w may have no information-theoretic entropy conditioned on p. The key difference in our approach is that instead of extracting from w, we hide secret randomness using w. Computational extractors are not allowed to have private randomness [Kra10, Definition 3].
The main advantage of our analysis (instead of sketch-and-comp-extract) is that security need not depend on the error-tolerance t. In our construction, the error-tolerance depends only on the best available decoding algorithm for random linear codes, because decoding algorithms will not reach the informationtheoretic decoding radius.
Unfortunately, LWE parameter sizes require relatively long w. Therefore, in practice, sketch-thencomp-extract will beat our construction if the computational extractor is instantiated efficiently based on assumptions other than LWE (for example, a cryptographic hash function for an extractor and a block cipher for a PRG). However, we believe that our conceptual framework can lead to better constructions.
Of particular interest are other codes that are easy to decode up to t errors but become computationally hard as the number of errors increases.
To summarize, the advantage of Construction 4.1 is that the security of our construction does not depend on the decoding radius t. The disadvantages of Construction 4.1 are that it supports a limited number of errors and only a uniformly distributed source. We begin to address this second problem in the next section.
Computational Fuzzy Extractor for Nonuniform Sources
While showing the security of Construction 4.1 for arbitrary high-min-entropy distributions is an open problem, in this section we show it for a particular class of distributions called symbol-fixing. First we recall the notion of a symbol fixing source (from [KZ07, Definition 2.3]):
Definition 5.1. Let W = (W 1 , ..., W m+α ) be a distribution where each W i takes values over an alphabet Z. We say that it is a (m + α, m, |Z|) symbol fixing source if for α indices i 1 , . . . , i α , the symbols W iα are fixed, and the remaining m symbols are chosen uniformly at random. Note that H ∞ (W ) = m log |Z|.
The following theorem states the main technical result of this section, which is of potential interest outside our specific setting. The result is that dist-LWE with symbol-fixing sources is implied by standard dist-LWE (but for n and m reduced by the amount of fixed symbols).
Theorem 5.2. Let n be a security parameter, m, α be polynomial in n, and q = poly(n) be a prime and β ∈ Z + be such that q −β = ngl(n). Let U denote the uniform distribution over Z m for an alphabet Z ⊂ F q , and let W denote an (m+α, m, |Z|) symbol fixing source over Z m+α . If dist-LWE n,m,q,U is secure, then dist-LWE n+α+β,m+α,q,W is also secure.
Theorem 5.2 also holds for an arbitrary error distribution (not just uniform error) in the following sense. Let χ be an arbitrary error distribution. Define χ as the distribution where m dimensions are sampled according to χ and the remaining dimensions have some fixed error. Then, security of dist-LWE n,m,q,χ implies security of dist-LWE n+α+β,m+α,q,χ . We show this stronger version of the theorem in Appendix B.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Providing a single sample with no error "fixes" at most a single variable. Thus, if there are significantly more variables than samples with no error, search LWE should still be hard. We are able to show a stronger result that dist-LWE is still hard. The nontrivial part of the reduction is using the additional α + β variables to "explain" a random value for the last α samples, without knowing the other variables. The β parameter is the slack needed to ensure that the "free" variables have influence on the last α samples.
Theorem 5.2 allows us to construct a lossless computational fuzzy extractor from block-fixing sources:
Theorem 5.3. Let n be a security parameter and let t = c log n for some positive constant c. If GAPSVP and SIVP are hard to approximate within polynomial factors using quantum algorithms, then there is a setting of q = poly(n) such that for any polynomial s sec = poly(n) there exists = ngl(n) such that the following holds: Construction 4.1 is a (M, W, m log |Z|, t)-computational fuzzy extractor that is ( , s sec )-hard with error δ = e −Ω(n) . The generate procedure Gen takes O(n 2 ) operations over F q , and the reproduce procedure Rep takes expected time O(n 4d+3 log n) operations over F q . 
A Properties of Random Linear Codes
For efficient decoding of Construction 4.1, we need the LWE instance to have high distance with overwhelming probability. We will use the q-ary entropy function, denoted H q (x) and defined as
The following theorem is standard in coding theory:
and sufficiently large m, the following holds for n
is drawn uniformly at random, then the linear code with A as a generator matrix has rate at least (1 − H q (δ) − ) and relative distance at least δ with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(m) .
Our setting is the case where m = poly(n) ≥ 2n and δ = O(log n/n). This setting of parameters satisfies Theorem A.1:
Corollary A.2. Let n be a parameter and let m = poly(n) ≥ 2n. Let q be a prime and τ = O( m n log n). For large enough values of n, when A ∈ F m×n q is drawn uniformly, the code generated by A has distance at least τ with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(m) ≥ 1 − e −Ω(n) .
Proof. Let c be some constant. Let δ = τ /m = c log n n . We show the corollary for the case when m = 2n (increasing the size of m only increases the relative distance). It suffices to show that for sufficiently large n, there exists > 0 where 1 − H q ( c log n n ) − = 1/2 or equivalently that H q ( c log n m ) < 1/2 as then setting = 1/2 − H q ( c log n n ) satisfies Theorem A.1. For sufficiently large n:
• c log n n < 1/2, so we can work with the binary entropy function H 2 .
• c log n n < .1 < 1/2 and thus H q ( c log n n ) < H q (.1).
Putting these statements together, for large enough n, H q ( c log n n ) < H q (.1) < H 2 (.1) < 1/2 as desired. This completes the proof.
We also need that random matrices are full rank with high probability (to allow us to decode). We use the following claim (techniques from Cooper [Coo00] ): Claim A.3. Let q ≥ 2 be a prime. Let α, β be integers and let let S Proof. Let p i be the probability that the ith row is linearly dependent on the previous i − 1 rows. By the union bound, the probability that α rows are linearly dependent is bounded by α i=1 p i . Since i − 1 rows can span a space of size at most q i−1 , the probability p i that a randomly chosen ith row is in that space is at most q i−1 /q α+β . So
B Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. We assume that all of the fixed blocks are located at the end and their fixed value is 0. If the blocks are fixed to some other value, the reduction is essentially the same. In the reduction, the distinguisher is allowed to depend on the source and can know the positions of the fixed blocks and their values. For a matrix A we will denote the i-th row by a i . For a set T of column indices, we denote by A T the restriction of the matrix A to the columns contained in T . Similarly, for a vector x we denote by x T the restriction of x to the variables contained in T . We use similar notation for the complement of T , denoted T c . For a matrix or vector we use T to denote the transpose. We use i as a index into matrix rows and the error vector and j as an index into columns and the solution vector. Let n be a security parameter, m, q, α = poly(n). Let β be such that q −β = ngl(n). All operations are computed modulo q, and we omit " mod q" notation. Let χ be some error distribution over F m q and let χ over F m+n q be defined by sampling χ to obtain values on dimensions 1, ..., m and then appending α 0s.
Let D be a distinguisher that breaks dist-LWE (m+α),(n+α+β),q,χ with advantage > 1/poly(n). Let A denote the uniform distribution over F (m+α)×(n+α+β) q , X denote the uniform distribution over F (n+α+β) q , and U denote the uniform distribution over F m+α
We build a distinguisher that breaks dist-LWE m,n,q,χ . Let A denote the uniform distribution over F m×n q , X denote the uniform distribution over F n q , and U denote the uniform distribution over F m q . We will build a distinguisher D of polynomial size for which
D will make a single call to D, so we focus on how to prepare a random block-fixing instance for D from the random instance that D is given. The code for D is given in Figure 1 . The distinguisher D has an advantage when S is of rank α. This occurs with overwhelming probability:
Proof. Direct result of Claim A.3 because q −β = ngl(n).
The probability that a random S is not full rank is ngl(n) so the distinguisher D must still have an advantage when the matrix S is full rank. That is,
It suffices to show that D prepares a good instance for D conditioned on S being full rank. We show this in the following three claims:
1. If A is a random matrix then A is a random matrix subject to the condition that rank(S) = α.
2. If b = A x + e for uniform A and x , then ∃x (uniformly distributed and independent of A and e ) such that b = Ax + e, where e i = e i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and e i = 0 otherwise.
3. If the conditional distribution b | A is uniform, then the conditional distribution b | A is also uniform.
Claim B.2. The matrix A is distributed as a uniformly random choice from the set of all matrices whose bottom-right α × (α + β) submatrix S satisfies rank(S) = α.
Proof. The bottom α rows of A (namely, R|S) are randomly generated (conditioned on rank(S) = α).
The top left m × n quadrant of A is also random, because it is produced as a sum of a uniformly random A with some values that are uncorrelated with A . The submatrix of the top-right m × (α + β) quadrant corresponding to Q T c (recall this is the restriction of Q to the columns not in T ) is also random, because to be the zero matrix.
uniformly at random.
If rank(S) < α, stop and output a random bit.
5. Find a set of α linearly independent columns in S. Let T be the set of indices of these columns.
Choose x n+j $ ← F q uniformly at random.
For i = 1, ..., m:
7. Initialize A * = A Q R S .
8. For i = 1, ..., m:
Choose a row vector γ i ← F 1×α q uniformly at random.
Output D(A, b).
Figure 1: A PPT D that distinguishes LWE using distinguisher for LWE w/ block fixing source it is initialized with random values to which some uncorrelated values are then added. It is important to note that all these values are independent of γ i values. Thus, we restrict attention to the m × α submatrix of A that corresponds to Q T in A * (note that these values are 0 in A * ). Consider a particular row i. That row is computed as γ i S T . Since S T is a full rank square matrix and γ i is uniformly and independently generated, that row is also uniform and independent of other entries in A.
Claim B.3. If D is provided with input distributed as A , b = A x + e then b = Ax + e, where
• e i = 0 for m < i ≤ m + α,
• and x j is uniform and independent of A and e for n < j ≤ n + α + β, Proof. Partially define x as x j = x j if 1 ≤ j ≤ n and x j as the value generated in step 6 for j > n and j ∈ T . Define the remaining variables x T as the solution to the following system of equations.
A solution x T exists as S T is full rank. Moreover, it is uniform and independent of A and e, because b * m+1 , . . . , b * m+α are uniform and independent of A and e. We now show that b * = A * x + e. All entries in matrix Q corresponding to variables in T are set to zero. Thus, the values of x T do not affect b * i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The values of x T c are manually set, and Q i,j x j is added to the corresponding b * i . Thus, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have b * = A * x + e. For m < i, this constraint is also satisfied by the values of x T set in Equation 2.
Thus, it remains to show that step 8 preserves this solution. We now show that for all rows 1
Recall the other rows are not modified. We have the following for 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
We consider the product (R||S)x. It suffices to show that
This completes the proof of the claim. 
is uniform, and Γ is invertible, b | (A * , Γ) must also be uniform. Since A is a deterministic function of A * and Γ (assuming Step 5 is deterministic-if not, we can fix the coins used), the distribution b | A is the same as b | (A * , Γ) and is thus also uniform.
Finally, the reduction runs in polynomial time and together Claims B.2, B.3, and B.4 show that when rank(S) = α the distinguisher D properly prepares the instance thus,
Where the second line follows because we can detect when rank(S) < α and output a random bit in this case. Thus, Equation (1) is satisfied, this completes the proof. 
Let C denote the of set all c ∈ C where c ≤ 2 . Note that Pr c←C [c ∈ C ] ≥ 1/2. Since H ∞ (C) ≥ k, we know |C | ≥ 2 k−1 (otherwise Pr c←C [c ∈ C ] = c∈C Pr[C = c] would be less than 2 k−1 1 2 k = 1/2). This completes the proof of the Lemma 3.5.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.6
Proof. Let W be an arbitrary distribution of min-entropy m. Let (X, Y ) be a joint distribution such that
where s sec ≥ t(s neigh + s rec ). One such (X, Y ) must exist by the definition of conditional HILL entropy. Define D as:
2. For all 1 ≤ t ≤ t:
If Rec(w , z) = w output 0. BecauseH ∞ (X|Y ) ≥ k, we know that E y←Y max x Pr[X y = x] ≤ 2 k . Applying Markov's inequality to the random variable max x Pr[X y = x], there exists a set S Y such that Pr[y ∈ S Y ] > 1/2, and for all y ∈ S Y , H ∞ (X y ) ≥ k − 1 (we can use the strict version of Markov's inequality here, because the random variable max x Pr[X y = x] is positive). Fix one value y ∈ S Y ∩ S Y (which exists because the sum of probabilities of S Y and S Y is greater than 1). Thus, for all such that t , 1 ≤ t ≤ t,
Thus, X y is a (t, 2( + tδ))-average error Shannon code with recovery Rec(·, y) and 2 k−1 points. The statement of the theorem follows by application of Lemma 3.5.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 3.10
Instead of proving the result just for Hamming metric over Z n , we will prove the result for any metric space that is both neighborhood samplable (Definition 3.2) and where picking a random point in the space is easy. We now define this second condition: Definition C.1. A metric space space (M, dis) is s sam -efficiently-samplable if there exists a randomized circuit Sample of size s sam that outputs a uniformly random point in M. Theorem C.2. Let W be a distribution over a metric space (M, dis) that is s sam samplable and (s neigh , t) neighborhood samplable. Furthermore, assume that the number of points within distance t in M is at least some fixed value B t (·). Let (SS, Rec) be an unpredictability-entropy (M, H ∞ (W ),m, t) secure sketch that is ( , s sec )-secure with error δ. If s sec ≥ max{t(|Rec| + s neigh ), |Rec| + s sam }, thenm ≤ log |M| − log |B t (·)| + log(1 − − tδ).
Proof. Let (X, Y ) be two random variables such that δ Ds sec ((W, SS(W )), (X, Y )) ≤ . It suffices to show that ∃I of size s sec such that Pr[I(Y ) = X] ≥ |M|(1 − − tδ)/|B t (·)|.
Let B t (x) denote the random variable representing a random neighbor of distance at most t from x (note that B t may not be efficiently samplable, because we are assuming only that a neighbor a fixed distance is efficiently samplable). We begin by showing that Rec must recover points of X.
Note that |I| = |Rec| + s sam . We now show that I predicts X:
(the last step follows by Claim C.3). Theorem 3.10 follows by noting that Z n can be sampled in time n log |Z| and neighborhood sampled in time n log |Z|.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Proof. Note that Decode t will stop if w and w agree on all the rows selected in Step 2 (it may also stop for other reasons-namely, in step 4; but we do not use this fact to bound the expected running time). The probability of each selected row having an error is at most The probability that Decode t outputs ⊥ is bounded by The third line from the bottom follows from the fact that the locations of the errors are assumed to be independent of the sketch, and therefore independent of the matrix A. The second line from the bottom follows from Claim A.3 when β = n; note that, because we use the union bound and evaluate the probability separately for each value of j, we can treat A i 1 ,...,i 2n as a randomly chosen 2n × n matrix, ignoring the fact that these matrices are correlated. We claim that if the code generated by A has distance at least 2t + 1, then Decode t will output ⊥ or the correct x = x. Indeed, suppose x = x. Since A(x − x ) has at least 2t + 1 nonzero coordinates by the minimum distance of the code generated by A, and at most t of those can be zeroed out by the addition of w − w , such an x will not pass Step 6. The probability that the code generated by A has distance lower than 2t + 1 is at most e −Ω(n) (see Corollary A.2), the probability of outputting ⊥ is also e −Ω(n) (computed above). This gives the correctness bound for Decode t .
D Parameter Settings for Construction 4.1
In this section, we explain the different parameters that go into our construction. In Theorem 4.7 we give a lossless fuzzy extractor from a security parameter n and an error t. In this section, we discuss constraints imposed by 1) efficient decoding 2) maintaining security of the LWE instance and 3) ensuring no entropy loss of the construction. We begin by reviewing the parameters that make up our construction:
• |W |: The length of the source.
• t: Number of errors that can be supported.
• n: LWE security parameter (i.e., number of field elements in X), which must be greater than some minimum value n 0 for security.
• q: The size of the field.
• ρ: The fraction of the field needed for error sampling.
To ensure f is a constant, we set t = c log n for some constant c and that k = n/g for some constant g > 1. Finally we assume that m is the minimum value such that t ≤ d log n(m/n − 2) (that is, there are only as many dimensions as necessary for decoding using Lemma 4.6): n 3/2+σ + 1) log n Note that f is at a constant in n. Assuming n − k = n(1 − 1/g) > n 0 and letting t = c log n we get the following setting: Furthermore, we get decoding using O(n 4d+3 ) F q operations. We can output a k fraction of X and the bits will be pseudorandom (conditioned on A, AX + W ). The parameter g allows is a tradeoff between the number of dimensions needed for security and the size of the field q. In Theorem 4.7, we set g = 2 and output the first half of X. Setting 1 < g < 2 achieves an increase in output length (over the input length of W ). We also (arbitrarily) set σ = 1/2 to simplify the statement of Theorem 4.7, making ρq = 2(c/d + 2)n 2 .
D.1 Parameter Settings for Theorem 5.3
We repeat parameter settings for block fixing sources. We now have m + α as the number of samples, while n + α + ω(1) is the number of variables. We can support any setting where t, n, q, ρ, m, k, α satisfy the following constraints (for β = ω(1) and constants d, f ): To ensure f is a constant, we set t = c log n for some constant c and that k, α = n/3 and β = log n.
Finally we assume that m is the minimum value such that t ≤ d log n(m/n − 2) (that is, there are only as many dimensions as necessary for decoding using Lemma 4.6): Assuming n/3 − log(n) > n 0 and letting t = c log n we get the following setting: As before we arbitrarily set σ = 1/2, giving ρq = 2( c d + 2)n 2 . Also, if c < d then we get efficient decoding and ρ = o(1) satisfying the condition of Lemma 4.3.
